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Abstract—Background: Previous research has shown that
crypto APIs are hard for developers to understand and difficult
for them to use. They consequently rely on unvalidated boilerplate
code from online resources where security vulnerabilities are
common.
Aims and method: We analyzed 2,324 open-source Java
projects that rely on Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) to
understand how crypto APIs are used in practice, and what
factors account for the performance of developers in using these
APIs.
Results: We found that, in general, the experience of developers
in using JCA does not correlate with their performance. In
particular, none of the factors such as the number or frequency
of committed lines of code, the number of JCA APIs developers
use, or the number of projects they are involved in correlate with
developer performance in this domain.
Conclusions: We call for qualitative studies to shed light on
the reasons underlying the success of developers who are expert
in using cryptography. Also, detailed investigation at API level is
necessary to further clarify a developer obstacles in this domain.
Index Terms—Java cryptography, security, empirical study
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography has perhaps never been more important as a
means to secure data, but previous research has found that
cryptographic application programming interfaces (API) are
hard to understand and, consequently, are often misused by
developers [1]–[6].
Egele et al. examined the use of block ciphers and message
authentication codes in Android applications and found more
than 10,000 applications misused cryptographic primitives in
insecure manners [1]. Nadi et al. examined the reasons for
misuse of these APIs by surveying developers as well as
investigating questions on StackOverflow [7]. They concluded
that Java cryptography APIs are too low-level, and that devel-
opers would welcome crypto assistants as well as example-
driven documentation. Acar et al. [8] suggest the usability of
cryptographic APIs has an important role in making software
more secure, but have to conclude stark usability shortcomings
in existing crypto APIs. They identify simplicity of APIs,
clarity of documentation, default secure options, and secure
source code examples as factors that could sigificantly ease
the usage of cryptographic APIs.
Misuse of cryptographic APIs is widespread and the reasons
are manifold. Existing studies agree that only a small portion
of usages is actually correct and secure. We hypothesize that
identifying a portion of developers who properly use crypto
APIs, and studying their characteristics may help us to identify
the community of developers with cryptography expertise.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no such investigation
has been conducted.
In this paper, we study how developers perform in using
cryptographic APIs, and investigate whether developer expe-
rience impacts whether they use an API correctly or not. To
this end, we mined 2,324 Java projects, and checked them
for misuses of the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA). We
discovered that, on average, of 3.9 crypto uses in each project,
2.5 are not secure, and that developers have considerable
difficulties in using more than half of the APIs. We also
performed statistical analyses on the results to check for
correlations between several measures of developer experience
and success in using the APIs. We found that factors such as
the number and frequency of committed lines of code, API
diversity, and the number of projects developers are involved
in, do not influence their performance.
We plan to conduct qualitative studies to shed lights on
reasons underlying the success of developers who are expert
in using cryptography.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
section II, we explain the setup of our study, and present the
results in section III. In section IV we discuss related work,
and in section V we outline future directions of this research.
Finally, we conclude the paper in section VI.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY
This section summarizes the setup of the experiment, and
introduces some terminology that we use in the paper.Preprint – ESEM
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A. Setup
We mined Java projects on GitHub, and downloaded and
compiled those that use JCA. We then ran the CogniCrypt
tool on these projects to identify crypto issues. The experiment
entailed the following steps:
1) Identifying relevant projects: We initially started with
183 projects using JCA APIs that were identified in previous
work [2]. We were interested in collecting as many JCA
projects as possible that we could associate to each developer.
Therefore, instead of an exhaustive search on GitHub, we
checked what other projects each developer had contributed
to, and whether they use JCA. We continued this process
for every new project, and stopped when we obtained 2,324
projects that use JCA APIs. We used the GitHub API search
to check whether a project uses any of the crypto classes
specified in the CogniCrypt rule set. Based mainly on the
import statements in each project, we were able to identify
and download 2,780 projects. In case a project was forked,
we looked for the original repository to download.
2) Building projects: We needed to compile each project
in order to run a static analysis that identifies crypto misuses.
We wrote a bash script to build all the downloaded projects.
The bash script first checked the existence of the POM file in
the project’s path, and if it existed, we would continue with
compilation, otherwise we excluded the project. We tried to
compile projects using the Maven build tool, while skipping
the running of the tests (to save time). Many projects could
not be compiled due to dependencies that were not resolved.
We excluded such projects and did not manually investigate
the issue. Ultimately, we were able to compile and build 2,360
projects.
3) Analyzing projects: We used a static analysis tool called
CogniCrypt to detect known misuses of cryptographic APIs
in Java bytecode [2]. This tool takes a target program and
evaluates the program’s correctness with respect to predefined
method-call patterns, parameter constraints, and secure com-
positions of cryptography-related classes encoded as a set of
rules. We chose CogniCrypt for two main reasons: first, we had
contact with the main developers of this tool, who were willing
to support us in the execution of the experiment. Second,
CogniCrypt covers a wide range of crypto APIs while keeping
false positives at a manageably low rate (usually below 10%).
In this step, a bash script went through the folders of all
projects and recursively looked for the target/classes folder
where the .class files reside, to feed them into CogniCrypt.1
We specified a timeout of 15 minutes to abort lengthy analyses.
In the end, roughly 15% of the analyses were interrupted, and
we succeeded in analyzing 2,141 projects.
4) Reporting the results: A bash script parsed the analysis
reports in order to collect the assessment of each project. In
particular, for every project, it checked which crypto APIs
were (mis)used, and where in the source code such API usages
are located, i.e., the file name and the line number. With the
1We used the publicly available command-line version of CogniCrypt and
its rule set available at the time of running this analysis on Jan 16th, 2019.
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Fig. 1. The number of secure, total number of commits, and number of JCA
developers in each year
help of the git blame command we also identified the last
developer who committed the code associated with each API
use, as well as the commit time. We stored this information
in a database.
B. Terminology
In this paper, when we refer to APIs we mean those provided
by the JCA framework, and a developer is one who commits
such API usages to a source file that belongs to one of the
included projects in this study. A commit/file/project is secure
when there is no API misuse, otherwise it is buggy. Finally,
we use the term commits to refer to the last crypto-related
committed lines of code.
III. RESULTS
We first present the state of cryptography uses in open-
source Java projects, and then present our study of the factors
that may influence developers’ performance.
A. The State of Cryptography Uses
We analyzed a total of 2,324 projects, i.e., 2,141 plus the
183 initial projects. These projects consisted of a total of 2,652
unique files containing JCA APIs, which means, on average,
1.4 files per project with a standard deviation of 1.4.
Figure 1 depicts the number of commits and developers in
each year. As expected, the increase in the number of devel-
opers, the number of commits increases as well. This increase
may be due to the emergence of having more cryptographic
features in software systems. However, we assume developers
do not necessarily learn how to properly use crypto APIs as
the number of secure commits are much lower than the total
number of commits in each year.
Table I depicts the numbers of secure and buggy projects
and commits, and their totals. We found an average of 1.7
distinct API usages per project with a standard deviation of
1.3. There is an average number of 3.9 commits per project
with a standard deviation of 7.4, of which an average of 1.4
are secure commits and 2.5 are buggy.
Table II presents the numbers of distinct developers who
always committed secure code, always buggy code, or both
secure and buggy code, as well as the total numbers of
TABLE I
THE STATUS OF PROJECTS AND COMMITS
Secure Buggy Total
Projects 642 1,682 2,324
Commits (LoC) 3,263 5,897 9,160
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
128
256
512
1024
2048
4096
8192
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 18
Nu
mb
er
Number of projects
Number of JCA developers Number of commits
Fig. 2. The distribution of developers and their commits in different projects
commits made by each group of JCA developers. We observed
that 27.41% of developers consistently used the JCA correctly.
The mean value of commits by these developers was 2 with
a standard deviation of 1.9. About 42% of developers had
mistakes in every commit. These developers on average made
3.4 commits with a standard deviation of 3.8. The remaining
491 developers had a mean value of 12.13 commits with a
standard deviation of 13.67. These developers did not perform
well either: the chance of a secure commit is above 45% only
for about half of them (i.e., 52.34%).
TABLE II
THE STATUS OF DEVELOPERS AND THEIR COMMITS
Developer Commits (LoC)
Always secure commits 440 909
Always buggy commits 647 2,293
Secure and buggy commits 491 5,958
We also explored how many distinct developers have con-
tributed to different numbers of projects (see Figure 2). We can
observe a slight decrease in the number of developers and their
total number of commits as the number of involved projects
increases. On average 1.18 JCA developers contributed to each
project, and each developer contributes to an average of 1.4
projects. The highest rate of contributions to JCA projects
belongs to two developers who have contributed to 18 projects
and produced 118 commits. In our dataset, 98.13% of the
population of developers and 88.48% of commits are involved
in five or fewer projects.
Finally, we found that, among the 19 cryptography APIs,
MessageDigest was used the most i.e., 2,859 times
by 790 developers. The Cipher, SecureRandom,
and SecretKeySpec are the next top APIs that
were used more than 1,000 times. Figure 3 presents
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Fig. 3. The secure versus total number of each API use in percentage
the distribution of each API use. We can see
that DSAParameterSpec, DHParameterSpec,
SecretKey, and SecureRandom were almost always
used correctly. Similarly, developers showed promising
performance in using the SecretKeyFactory, and MAC
APIs, i.e., at least 87% usages were correct. Developers
seem to have severe difficulties in using about half of
the APIs whose correct usages were less than 25%. The
correct usages of five APIs namely, SecretKeySpec,
IvParameterSpec, Cipher, Signature, and
PBEParameterSpec were at most 6.58%.
We found that, on average, of 3.9 crypto uses in each
project, 2.5 are not secure. Developers have difficulties
in using certain APIs, which require further investigations
at API level to understand the reasons underpinning this
dilemma.
B. Factors Influencing Developer Performance
We define a performant developer as one who makes more
secure than buggy commits. Our assumption is that by making
more commits, contributing to more projects, working with a
wide range of crypto APIs to accomplish different scenarios,
and finally being engaged more days with cryptographic
APIs can perhaps increase the experience of developers. We
therefore collected four factors, namely the numbers of (1)
JCA commits, (2) APIs used, (3) projects, and (4) days a
developer committed, and studied whether these factors, which
we assumed they account for developer experience, have an
impact on the performance (number of buggy and secure
commits) of developers in using cryptography.
We studied the correlation only between each of the four
aforementioned factors, and the numbers of secure and buggy
commits so as to find factors highly correlated with developer
performance. Both visual inspection and application of the
Shapiro-Wilk test confirmed that our data is not normally
distributed. We therefore used the Spearman correlation which
does not assume that the data follow a normal distribution
TABLE III
THE SPEARMAN CORRELATION MATRIX
# JCA commits # Project # Days # API used # Secure # Buggy
# JCA commits 0.42 0.47 0.75 0.53 0.74
# Project 0.42 0.55 0.28 0.3 0.27
# Days 0.47 0.55 0.43 0.34 0.31
# API used 0.75 0.28 0.43 0.6 0.51
# Secure 0.53 0.3 0.34 0.6 -0.051
# Buggy 0.74 0.27 0.31 0.51 -0.051
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Fig. 4. Secure and buggy commits based on the number of JCA commits
grouping
[9]. For every two variables, it generates a number between 1
and −1 depending on whether the relationship is positive or
negative, respectively.
Table III depicts the correlation matrix between pairs of
variables. The variables with a correlation score greater than
0.5 or less than −0.5 with secure and buggy commits are the
number of JCA commits and the number of JCA APIs used.
In the following we study whether these two factors really
account for developer performance.
1) Number of commits: We grouped developers by quartiles
of a boxplot which reflects the distribution of developers based
on their numbers of commits. Correspondingly, the numbers
of their commits can be grouped into three categories ranging
from 2 to 4, 5 to 8, or 9 to more number of commits.
Figure 4 presents these groups, and the numbers of secure
and buggy commits in each group. Visually, it is clear that all
three groups exhibit an increase in the numbers of secure and
buggy commits as the total number of commits increases while
the median and the average numbers of buggy commits are
always more than those of secure commits. In the first group,
the median of secure commits is zero while it improved in
the latter groups. In the last two groups with more commits,
the upper whiskers of secure commits show that the maximum
number of secure commits is fewer than the maximum number
of buggy commits.
To establish statistical evidence, we pose the following
null hypothesis: the groups of commits are from identical
populations. To avoid the dispersion of the absolute numbers
of secure and buggy commits, we evaluated this hypothesis
from the developer performance perspective i.e., the number
of secure commits divided by the total number of commits
TABLE IV
THE WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST RESULT FOR THE PERFORMANCE VS.
COUNTS
First group Second group
Second group 0.0273
Third group 0.0018 1.000
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Fig. 5. Performance vs. number of JCA commits
by each developer. Therefore, we checked whether the perfor-
mance of developers in the different groups is the same.
We used a rank-based nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test
since the three groups did not have a normal distribution
and this violates one of the assumptions of the one-way
ANOVA test. The test resulted a p-value of 0.001315 (chi-
square 13.269, and df 2), which indicates strong evidence that
at least one of the groups is different.
We carried out post hoc analysis to find out which pairs of
groups are significantly different. We used pairwise Wilcoxon
signed rank comparison with the Bonferroni adjustment for
the p-value. Table IV presents the result. We can verify that
the first group has a significant difference compared to the
second and third group (the p-values are considerably less than
0.05). Nevertheless, the second group comes from an identical
population as the third group.
Figure 5 presents the performance of developers versus the
number of commits they have made. In the plot, we can see
that many developers with a low number of commits have
a performance close to either zero or one. The reason for
this is clearly that, with few commits, every secure or buggy
commit has a much greater impact on the performance than
for developers with many commits. For this reason the first
group, with only few commits, has a different profile than
the others. The trend line shows that with the increase in
the number of commits the performance slightly decreases;
we believe that with more commits, more APIs are used,
which consequently increases the chance of bugs. Therefore,
if we do not consider the first group, we can accept the null
hypothesis, and conclude that the performance of developers
in the remaining groups is identical. In other words, we cannot
conclude that developer experience, as measured by number
of commits, clearly influences their performance.
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Fig. 6. Secure and buggy commits based on API grouping
TABLE V
THE WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TEST RESULT FOR PERFORMANCE VS. API
First group Second group
Second group 0.00056
Third group 0.00024 0.19557
To summarize, although the number of commits is corre-
lated with the number of secure and buggy commits, we
did not observe any correlation between the number of
commits and developer performance, i.e., the fraction of
secure commits.
2) Number of APIs: We grouped developers by quartiles of
a boxplot, which reflects their distribution based on the number
of different JCA APIs that they use. Correspondingly, the
numbers of their commits can be grouped into three categories
ranging from 1 to 2, 3, or 3 to more APIs. Figure 6 presents
these groups, and the numbers of secure and buggy commits
in each group. Similar to the number of commits, the median
number of secure commits in the first group is zero and it
increases as the number of APIs increases. The mean value
of buggy commits in each group is always higher than secure
commits and the maximum value is notably higher than secure
commits. To establish statistical evidence, we computed the
performance of each developer (i.e., secure commits divided
by total number of commits), and used this metric instead of
the absolute number of secure and buggy commits. We define
the following null hypothesis: The performance of developers
is similar in groups that use a different number of APIs. The
Kruskal-Wallis test shows a significant difference in at least
one of the groups. In particular, the p-value of 2.956e-06 (Chi-
square 25.464) is not even close to the cutoff value (i.e., 0.05),
which shows a significant difference in the three groups.
The Wilcoxon signed rank test shows that the first group has
a considerable difference with the other groups (See Table V).
Further investigation showed that developers in the first group
mostly overlap with those with the lowest number of commits
(i.e., 2 to 4 commits). As in the previous subsection, we
observe that every commit has a much higher impact on
performance for these developers compared to other groups,
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Fig. 7. Performance vs. number of APIs
leading to the difference of the first group with others. If
we account for this phenomenon, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis, and conclude that the performance of developers
who use different APIs is identical. Figure 7 also shows the
performance of developers versus the number of APIs that
they used. Clearly, there is no sharp negative or positive trend
in the performance of developers can be seen as the number
of API increases.
To sum up, even though the APIs are strongly correlated
with the number of secure and buggy commits, we did not
observe any correlation between this factor and developer
performance
C. Threats to Validity
We analyzed 2,324 Java projects that use JCA APIs. We
found these projects through the contributors of some initial
projects that were identified in previous work. We did not
define any criteria for selecting the remaining projects, but
they may not represent the whole Java ecosystem. Also, we
only focused on Maven projects and did not look for Gradle or
ANT projects. We relied on CogniCrypt for misuse detection
as it provides state-of-the art static analyses and covers a
wide range of API misuses. Whereas certain limitations are
inherent in static analysis in general, we did not check for the
existence of false positives in the results as the authors have
done so and found the tool to be fairly precise. We aborted
the analysis of each project after 15 minutes. Increase in the
timeout may yield more projects to be analyzed. We used the
git blame command in order to identify the last developer
who has committed a change to that line of code, and did not
look into the commit history. Though the last commit can be
due to some refactoring or maintenance purposes, we studied
several cases and did not find any other changes concerning
crypto APIs. Moreover, commits can be an outcome of several
works by different people locally where the resulting commit
is the only visible one.
IV. RELATED WORK
Nadi et al. surveyed 11 developers who asked crypto-related
questions on Stack Overflow, as well as 37 developers who
used Java’s cryptography APIs, and found that developers are
confident in selecting the right cryptography concepts, but
they have difficulties in using certain cryptographic algorithms
correctly. They concluded that crypto APIs are generally
perceived to be too low-level, and developers prefer more
task-based solutions [7]. Acar et al. manually analyzed the
security properties of Stack Overflow posts, which their par-
ticipants used to resolve pre-defined challenges, and they
automatically analyzed 200,000 randomly sampled apps from
the Google Play market [10]. They observed that real-world
Android developers use Stack Overflow and are unwilling
to use official Android API documentation. Gorski et al.
conducted a controlled experiment with 53 participants to
study the effectiveness of API-integrated security advice. Their
results exhibit that their approach considerably helps 73% of
the participants to produce more secure code by employing
security guidance from the documentation [11]. Yasemin et
al. suggested that documentation with secure and easy-to-use
code examples of cryptographic APIs could help developers in
using the API correctly [8]. Researchers have also developed
static analysis tools that facilitate the use of cryptography.
Rahman et al. developed a static analysis tool named RIG-
ORITYJ to reduce false positives in finding cryptographic
misuses [3]. They evaluated 46 large-scale Apache projects
and 6,181 Android apps. They found 96% of the Android
applications to be vulnerable, and found 1,961 warnings in
Apache projects. Egele et al. developed a static analysis
application named CryptoLint, which was tested on 11,748
applications using cryptographic APIs [1]. They showed that
88% of the applications have at least one cryptographic API
misuse. Krüger et al. proposed a tool called CogniCrypt,
an Eclipse plugin that enables developers to securely use
cryptographic API [12]. CogniCrypt also provides developers
with secure code templates. Furthermore, CogniCrypt comes
with CrySL, a description language for correct usages of
cryptographic APIs, which empowers cryptographic experts to
expand correct usages for other APIs [2]. Shuai et al. created
a prototype system named Crypto Misuse Analyzer(CMA),
which can efficiently identify the crypto misuse vulnerabilities
based on the pre-defined model [4]. In their experiment,
more than half of the analyzed Android applications have
cryptographic misuse vulnerabilities.
V. RESEARCH PLAN
Additional studies are needed to find a relation between
developer experience and developer performance. First, we
need to understand how developers with good performance
obtain this level of proficiency to cope with the challenges
of using crypto APIs. We therefore would like to survey
such developers, as well as those with low performance. In
particular, we would like to learn about the background of
developers, the training programs they have participated in, the
tools they use, and the information sources that they consult
with. In previous research, API complexity has been studied
generally. We have shown that certain APIs seem to be much
more complex for developers to use. We would like to delve
into the reasons that harden such API uses. In particular, we
will investigate whether the difference is in the API design,
the quality of documentation, or available code examples.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated 2,324 open-source Java projects whose code
contains usages of Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA). We
discovered that, on average, of 3.9 crypto uses in each project,
2.5 are not secure, and that developers have great difficulties in
using more than half of the APIs. We also studied four factors
that rationalize developer experience namely the number of
JCA commits, API diversity, the number of projects developers
are involved in, and the frequency of committed lines of
code. We found that none of these factors influence developer
performance in this domain.
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